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“DELIBERATIVE,” “INDEPENDENT” 
TECHNOCRACY V. DEMOCRATIC 





The building blocks for a future transnational and sometimes global admin-
istrative law are not difficult to identify, though there are quite a number.  
Some can be derived almost entirely from past U.S. experiences.  The European 
Union, lying somewhere between an international treaty-based organization 
and a constitutional federalism, is particularly instructive—so, too, are the 
WTO and NAFTA, which share the free trade aspects of the E.U.  Finally, par-
allel or converging developments in administration and its law in a number of 




The first great building block is regulation.  Health, safety, environmental, 
consumer protection, and labor regulations designed to mitigate the downsides 
of capitalist free markets have been a major feature of the political economies 
of individual states for a long time.  By the late twentieth century, they had mul-
tiplied enormously, due in part to the great ideological upswing in environmen-
talism, to the fear of risk, and to the movement away from socialism and toward 
markets—thus, the perceived need for more market regulation.1  By the twenty-
first century, some of this blossoming of regulation has moved on from parallel 
national development to transnational arenas.  Most notably, the E.U. transi-
tioned from clearing away a dense web of national regulations inhibiting cross-
border trade, to itself creating a dense web of transnational regulation.  Both 
the WTO and NAFTA now show comparable potential. 
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 1. See, e.g., TRANSATLANTIC POLICYMAKING IN AN AGE OF AUSTERITY: DIVERSITY AND 
DRIFT (Martin Levin & Martin Shapiro eds., 2004). 
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The dynamic of extended free trade and extended regulation is simple 
enough.  Differing national regulations are an impediment to trade.  Variations 
in costs to producers imposed by differing national regulations lead to competi-
tive advantages and disadvantages among national trading partners, and fears of 
deregulatory competition among them lead to a rush-to-the-bottom-of-
regulation mentality to gain competitive advantage.  The obvious answer is to 
level the playing field by substituting transnational for national regulation.  This 
“upward” movement of regulation-making, both in free trade areas organized 
as federal states and those organized further toward the pure treaty-based in-
ternational organization, leads to questions about which level of governance 
shall do how much implementing of the new transnational regulations. 
Long and detailed study (mostly of the American experience) has demon-
strated that policymaking and policy implementation can never be wholly sepa-
rated.2  The problem is particularly acute in government regulation—as opposed 
to service delivery—because the matters being regulated experience rapid and 
complex economic and technological change and incredible variation in detail 
over time and place.  In regulation, the devil is in the details.  Failures of regula-
tion are most obvious when regulations are actually being implemented.  Given 
the complexity of what is being regulated and the consequent complexity of the 
necessarily over-general regulations being written, the attainment of regulatory 
goals and purposes depend heavily on the many and continuous detailed inter-
pretations of the general rules that must be made by implementers.  So, alas, 
policymaking from on high and administration from the bottom is never wholly 
feasible, even if desirable. 
If administrative law is, among other things, the set of rules for the creation 
and implementation of regulation, then as we anticipate the growth of transna-
tional regulation with its endemic problems—problems created by the question 
of which level of governance does how much of what—we might anticipate the 
growth of transnational administrative law. 
III 
THE TENSION BETWEEN DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOCRACY 
A. Democracy v. Technocracy 
Because much of this regulation will be of relatively high-tech economic ac-
tivity, we can also anticipate that this growing transnational administrative law 
will encounter the same issues that the administrative law of high-tech national 
regulatory schemes has faced in the past.  For some high-tech states that pur-
port to be democratic, one central issue has been democracy versus technoc-
racy.  Precisely because what is being regulated is technologically complex and 
 
 2. See, e.g., THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Marc Landy & Martin Levin eds., 1996); 
SEEKING THE CENTER: POLITICS AND POLICYMAKING AT THE NEW CENTURY (Martin Levin et al. 
eds., 2001). 
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rapidly changing, regulators must have high technical skills themselves.  One 
cannot regulate what one does not understand.  It has become widely recog-
nized, however, that by virtue of the very specialization of knowledge required 
for the achievement of high technological skills, experts are themselves special 
interest groups whose perspectives and self-interests render them nonrepresen-
tative of the demos as a whole. 
There is an inevitable tension between democratic control of public policy, 
including regulatory policy, and regulation by experts.  This tension is a second 
major building block of a transnational or global administrative law, and this 
tension is aggravated in a number of dimensions.  One traditional solution, hav-
ing the experts “on tap but not on top,” does not work very well.  Given one set 
of people who know something and another who do not—and our normal 
Western belief that brain surgeons, not the man off the street, should do brain 
surgery—the experts supposedly on tap are likely in reality to end up on top.  
The non-experts on top might seek to shield themselves by soliciting rival ex-
pertise, but ultimately such a tactic will render the policy discourse more elabo-
rately technical and further beyond the comprehension of the non-expert.  
Faced with deciding something they clearly cannot understand, the non-experts 
must either appear arbitrary or seek consensus among contending experts, thus 
again reversing who is really on top. 
A second solution, apart from contending experts, has been the proclama-
tion of a special expertise topping other expertise.  This approach can be seen in 
the traditional, now largely defunct, British civil service tradition of the “admin-
istrative class,” in talks of “leadership” in the professional military corps, and in 
“diplomacy” in the professional diplomatic corps.  In such settings there is need 
for but a denigration of specialized experts, and a preference for the generalist 
who can see the big picture and coordinate the tunnel visions of all the experts.  
Accordingly, the generalist is called the general and commands, not because he 
is no longer the infantry man, the artillerist, or tanker, but because he can coor-
dinate all arms. 
However much this view has survived in the military, it is largely absent 
from the general public service, a victim of the dreaded new public management 
(NPM).  Such corps of elite, generalist, career civil servants—which were tar-
geted in the United Kingdom by the Yes, Minister television series—was the 
epitome of the hated bureaucracy that NPM was to destroy.  It sought to re-
place this bureaucracy with a new set of people having “management” skills di-
rected at getting the job done, which meant producing the particular service as-
signed to their particular agency.3 
Moreover, from the perspective of currently in-vogue, rational choice aco-
lytes, the generalist high civil servant, serving the public interest rather than the 
narrower interests of technological specialists or of the clients who seek to cap-
 
 3. There seems to have been little attention among NPM types to the fact that, in the private sec-
tor they so wish to emulate, the big bucks go not to managers who produce services but to corporate 
strategists. 
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ture them, is a mere fiction.  There really is no “public interest,” but only the 
special interest of whatever actor is projecting that interest onto the public.  The 
civil service mandarin has the disadvantage of lacking the technical knowledge 
to understand what she is doing, without the advantage of actually pursuing any 
public interest beyond cultivating her own perquisites—which are most easily 
defended by maintaining the status quo. 
Concomitant with this withdrawal of faith in a public service mandarin has 
been the politicization of the executive strata of the public service.4  In order to 
make government more politically responsive and responsible, more and more 
government executives should be politically appointed.  In one sense, this move 
does address the problem of democracy versus technocracy.  It seeks again to 
put the technocrat on tap but not on top, and to place on top that genuinely 
non-expert, generalist reflector of the public’s perspectives:  the politician.  Po-
litical executives, however, might find themselves even more easily captured by 
the experts than by civil service mandarins because they do not spend as much 
time in government executive positions as do senior civil servants, and so have 
less opportunity to learn how to keep experts on tap.  Furthermore, the very 
distrust of government that led to the politicization of the executive is exacer-
bated when political executives are perceived by the public as using executive 
office for partisan advantage. 
An acute problem at national levels, the balance between technocratic and 
democratic government is even more acute at transnational levels.  National, 
technocratic bureaucracies are embedded in democratic states—at least for-
mally, subordinately embedded in national governments—and are directly, 
electorally accountable to the people.  At transnational levels technocratic ad-
ministration is likely to precede directly, electorally accountable government.  
Even if one does not subscribe to functionalist or neo-functional theories of in-
ternational organization, our immediate practical experiences with transna-
tional organizations certainly support this point.  The E.U., with its thick web of 
regulation and notorious “democratic deficit,” is an obvious example.  It is diffi-
cult enough to put the expert on tap but not on top when there is an elected, po-
litically accountable top, yet it is much harder when there is not. 
B. Technocracy and Democracy in the U.S. and E.U. 
The United States and the E.U. provide instructive examples of the two 
ends of the spectrum.  In the United States, the New Deal ushered in a renewed 
respect for the virtues of an executive branch dominated by a super-democratic 
President, F.D.R.  That led to a sweeping judicial deference in administrative 
law to the so-called expertise of the newly expanded and empowered bureauc-
racy.  At this stage technocracy was seen as a virtue because it was supposedly 
subordinated to a President with the greatest democratic mandate in U.S. his-
tory. 
 
 4. EZRA SULEIMAN, DISMANTLING DEMOCRATIC STATES (2003). 
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The reformation of U.S. administrative law consists of an up-welling of judi-
cial suspicion of technocracy.  The judge’s weapon is the imposition of partici-
pation and transparency requirements on the technocrats, which in effect create 
a new variety and level of democratic control over bureaucracy, substituting the 
pluralist democracy of interest group surveillance for the electoral democracy of 
Presidential control.5  This pluralism is supplemented with policy intervention 
by the judges themselves as virtual representatives of the non-expert demos.6  
The next and inevitable stage in this evolution is a resurgence of technocracy.  
Under interest group scrutiny, the government learns to armor its policy choices 
in real rather than assumed expertise, and litigation becomes the clash of oppos-
ing experts offered by government and interest groups. 
The result is not only far more thoroughly tested and justified government 
policies, but also the much-complained-of long delays in and high costs of deci-
sion.  A second result is the retreat of the judge as lay assessor of agency per-
formance, as the very records demanded by judges become far too technically 
complex for judges themselves to understand.  Thus, the very developments in 
administrative law designed to subject technocrats to democratic control have 
rearmed the technocracy.  At best, what is achieved is a kind of competition 
among technocrats, some in government and some employed by interest 
groups, rather than the previous monopoly of technical data granted to gov-
ernment by that old judicial deference to administrative expertise.  There might 
be some offsetting democratic pressure from allegedly increased Presidential 
partisan influence on regulatory decisions,7 but if so, it occurs not with the assis-
tance of but in the teeth of an administrative law that requires agencies to pre-
tend that their decisions are fully technically justified. 
In the E.U., comparable dynamics of judicial demands for transparency, par-
ticipation, and full justification may be emerging,8 but the far more prevalent 
trend has been an attempt to recruit technocratic legitimacy for government 
regulation as a substitute for democratic legitimacy.9  The Council is the general 
lawmaking body for the Union.  It is not directly elected.  Its members are dele-
gates, typically cabinet members, of the Member States.  Given the parliamen-
tary form of all those states, such delegates are indirectly democratic in that 
they are members of and sent by the elected governments of the Member 
States.  A further democratic element is that voting in the Council on most 
questions reflects more populous states, whose delegates cast more votes.  The 
 
 5. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
 6. MARTIN SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 54 (1968). 
 7. See Walter Mattli and Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance:  Lessons from a National Model 
of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 8. CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 159-65 (2002); H.P. NEHL, 
PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN E.C. LAW (1999); MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC 
STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION ch. 4 (2002); Martin Shapiro, The Institu-
tionalization of European Administrative Space, in THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPE 94 (W. 
Sandholtz et al. eds., 2001). 
 9. REGULATING EUROPE (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1996). 
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increasing role of the directly elected Parliament in the lawmaking process is 
another element.  Yet for a variety of reasons—most notably the merely incipi-
ent development of Union-wide political parties—the E.U. itself enjoys a far 
less democratic lawmaking process than do each of its Member States.10 
As the experiences of all developed modern states make clear, secondary, 
detailed norms—called “rules” in the United States and “delegated legislation” 
in the United Kingdom— are vital elements in regulation.  It is the rulemaking 
process that was transformed with the transformation of U.S. administrative 
law.  In the E.U., the Council passes a great deal of regulatory legislation that 
delegates the making of such rules to committees—also known as the practice 
of “comitology.”  Typically, each particular Council enactment of this sort cre-
ates an ad hoc committee—ad hoc in the sense that it is created solely to draft 
rules for one statute.  The membership of each such committee is chosen by the 
E.U. Commission and must consist of technical experts from each of the Mem-
ber States.  At first, committee proceedings were totally opaque.  Now some 
transparency has been added.  The Commission itself is a non-elected techno-
cratic body.  If the expert committees and the Commission agree on a draft rule, 
it becomes law.  If not, the committee draft is subject to a kind of legislative 
veto device wielded by the Council.  The comitology process thus exhibits an 
extremely attenuated democratic control over technocratic decisionmaking. 
This vice is celebrated as a great virtue by the defenders of comitology.11  
They argue that precisely because the E.U. government as a whole is deficient 
in democratic legitimacy, there is a need to substitute a technocratic bureau-
cracy for democratic legitimacy.  Indeed, they argue regulatory decisions should 
be kept out of politics entirely and be made instead purely on objective, techni-
cal grounds—on considerations of technological feasibility and economic effi-
ciency.  Any untoward consequences of such objective decisions—for instance, 
geographically or sectorially concentrated employment losses—should be han-
dled by compensatory measures enacted by the political process rather than by 
politically motivated “distortions” of the objective regulatory process.  Their 
very objectivity will recruit publicly perceived legitimacy for comitology gener-
ated rules. 
As a purely practical matter, it is highly doubtful that European citizens en-
dow technical bureaucracies with very high levels of legitimacy.  Whatever en-
dowment exists has been gravely drawn down by such recent scandals as the 
failure of both U.K. and E.U. regulators to promptly identify and stop the 
spread of mad cow disease, by the criminal conviction of French health officials 
for failure to take action to purge blood banks of possibly HIV-infected blood, 
and by corruption allegations that led to major reforms at the Commission.  All 
modern governments are highly technocratic, and the contemporary withdrawal 
 
 10. THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW DEMOCRATIC IS IT? (Svein Andersen & Kjell Eliassen eds., 
2000). 
 11. E.U. COMMITTEES: SOCIAL REGULATION, LAW AND POLITICS (Christian Joerges & Ellen 
Vos eds., 1999).   
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of popular trust in government hardly distinguishes between its political and 
technocratic elements.  Indeed, anti-E.U. sentiment is far more often expressed 
as anger with the Eurocrats than as distaste for its explicitly political organs.  
Technocratic legitimacy may be a very weak reed to substitute for democratic 
legitimacy. 
More generally, the hope of dividing regulatory decisions into two catego-
ries—purely technical, non-political ones that should be handled by technocrats 
and compensatory ones that should handled by politicians—seems hollow.  
First, it seems highly improbable that all regulatory questions have isolated, 
fully known, technically and economically correct solutions devoid of discre-
tionary elements.  It is very late in the day to argue for a wall of separation be-
tween politics and political science. 
Second, it is utopian to expect that politicians, who will ultimately be held 
responsible for the costs imposed by regulation, will wait until after regulation 
has done the damage and then scurry around to try and make repairs through 
compensatory welfare programs.  It is more likely that they would rather seek 
to prevent the damage by intervening in the regulatory process.  Regulation 
frequently involves gaining diffuse benefits involving concentrated costs—for 
example, cleaner air at the cost of less profit and fewer jobs in the auto industry.  
Geographically elected politicians such as those of the E.U. are likely to be par-
ticularly sensitive to such regulations, but all elected politicians are necessarily 
more concerned with concentrated costs, no matter what the diffuse benefits, 
than are technocrats.  Voters are more likely than technocrats to weigh concen-
trated costs more heavily than diffuse benefits. 
Third, interest groups, aware that the devil is in the details and mindful of 
the advantages of getting in early, will not wait around until their particular in-
terests are damaged by “objective” technocratic decisions and thereafter limit 
themselves to seeking compensation from politicians.  The growing demands for 
and attempts at comitology transparency foreshadow this point.  Interest groups 
want to participate in the earliest stages of the regulatory process.  If they are 
told that those stages are technical, they are more than happy to offer their own 
technical experts to assist. 
IV 
E.U. COMITOLOGY AND TRANSNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The E.U. comitology process is particularly instructive for anyone consider-
ing the future growth of transnational or international regulation and its con-
comitant administrative law.  Given the difficulties of achieving political con-
sensus among nation-states, particularly when proposed transnational 
regulatory decisions potentially concentrate costs to some to achieve benefits 
for all, the appeal of transnational committees of experts fashioning objective 
regulatory norms is obvious.  Some would argue that the current stage of E.U. 
comitology is a good model for future international regulatory regimes and for 
other transnational schemes beyond the E.U. because, at their pure first stage, 
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the E.U. committees were subject to no administrative law and no judicial re-
view.  I would argue that comitology points more to a problem than a solution.  
The long and hard campaign of the E.U. Parliament to intervene in the comi-
tology process and the recent Commission initiatives toward greater committee 
transparency both indicate that many Europeans do perceive comitology as 
creating rather than resolving “democracy versus technocracy” issues.12 
Yet the comitology process also yields another major building block for 
imagining a global administrative law:  it was originally designed not to em-
power technical experts, but to empower nations.  The committees consist of 
members from each of the Member States.  While these persons are chosen by 
the Commission and are not literally representatives or delegates of their home 
states, they are almost invariably drawn from experts serving directly in their 
national governments’ civil services, researchers in government-financed re-
search organizations, or faculty serving in government-controlled universities. 
The logic seems simple enough.  If the Council is the meeting place of the 
Member States, then committees wielding the delegated lawmaking powers of 
the Council should also be the meeting place of the Member States.13  What this 
logic does not quite comprehend is that when the delegates are not nationally 
elected politicians but are instead national technical experts responsive to uni-
versal professional norms, it is not nationalism but professionalism that is likely 
to dominate the meeting.  A French nuclear engineer and a Greek nuclear en-
gineer are far more likely to see eye to eye than a French politician and a Greek 
politician, and they are likely to see through the eye of nuclear engineering.  
Thus, what may have been intended as the projection of national political inter-
est actually becomes an elevation of technocracy, with all the professional de-
formation or parochial perspectives endemic to specialized expertise. 
Experts chosen on a national basis will not, of course, be totally free of na-
tional bias.  Nor will all of them be dependents of their home governments.  
Some committee members will be drawn from among relatively independent 
academics and some from private sector employment—even employment by 
the relevant regulated industries.  Yet, without formal mechanisms for commit-
tee participation by experts affiliated with non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and by national and transnational politicians, the dominant norms of 
comitology will be expert norms.  Expert norms, however, are not necessarily 
the norms the rest of us share. 
Most international or multi-national regimes are going to be, at best, indi-
rectly democratic, governed by persons representing elected governments but 
who are not themselves elected.14  Precisely because political consensus in such 
regimes is perceived as difficult to achieve, there is a strong temptation to move 
 
 12. See Koen Lenaerts & Amaryllis Verhoeven, Towards a Legal Framework for Executive Rule-
Making in the E.U.?  The Contribution of the New Comitology Decision, 12 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
645, 645-60 (2000). 
 13. J.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE ch. 6 (1999). 
 14. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER  (2004). 
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toward more easily achieved expert consensus with a national basis for the 
choosing of the experts.  This serves as a screen of national representation be-
hind which a transfer of decisional power occurs from national (sometimes de-
mocratic) regimes to various technocracies whose norms, paradoxically, are 
both universal and parochial. 
Transnational regulation is more likely than national regulation to be domi-
nated by technocratic decisionmaking for another related reason:  transnational 
regimes are likely to involve the standard logic of cartels.  Each member of the 
cartel becomes and remains a member because each sees the joint cartel rules 
and practices as more advantageous to it individually than uncoordinated action 
by all members.  Yet each member is under the constant temptation to seek to 
initiate rules and practices most advantageous to itself.  In a nation-state setting, 
intervention by elected politicians against technocrats might appear democratic.  
In a transnational setting, however, attempts at political intervention in “techni-
cal” regulatory decisions largely will be attempts by politicians representing 
particular nation-states.  They will be seen not as democratic interventions 
against technocracy but as national interventions intended to gain national ad-
vantage at the expense of other members of the transnational regime.  There-
fore, in a transnational regulatory regime, politics and politicians tend to be 
identified with bad national self-interest, and international technicians with the 
common good. 
The U.S. experience suggests one, highly problematic counterweight to self-
interest:  experts affiliated with interest groups.  The flourishing of transnational 
NGOs and networks is much celebrated; and nationally defined interest groups 
are learning to act on the international scene.  Just as U.S. administrative law 
opened the closed circle of government experts to experts affiliated with rival 
interest groups, so future international or multi-national comitology regimes 
might provide transparency and participation rules fostering expanded pools of 
experts.  That is precisely the movement that I believe is at its early stages in the 
E.U. comitology process.  But of course, the U.S. experience also points to the 
dangers of regulatory inertia lurking in the potential battles of the experts fos-
tered by interest group participation in expert decisionmaking.15  The intersec-
tion of national interest representation and the empowerment of experts is one 
requiring careful attention by those constructing transnational regulatory re-
gimes. 
 
 15. See, e.g., Paul Verkuhl, Comment: Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 453, 453-58 (1995). 
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V 
DELIBERATION 
A. Deliberation, Democracy, and Technocracy 
Yet another building block in our construction of a global administrative 
law is the current appeal of the discourse of “deliberation.”  From true believers 
comes the assertion that policy decisions can be reached not by bargaining, log-
rolling, and compromising among the differing fixed interests of the various 
players at the table, but instead by a discussion at the table that can result in 
transcending interest aggregation to arrive at an unselfish achievement of truly 
good conclusions.16  A major feature in the collapse of faith in bureaucratic gov-
ernment has been the conclusion that the public interest is a will-o’-the-wisp 
that is beyond definition or achievement by anyone, let alone a specialized ex-
pert bureaucracy under pressure from interest groups and electorally oriented 
politicians.  The vogue in deliberation is a reassertion of faith in the public in-
terest—one that cleverly substitutes a procedural definition for a substantive 
definition that is impossible to obtain.  If there is enough talk, some take it as a 
matter of faith that the public interest will emerge. 
There are a number of reasons to be agnostic if not atheistic about delibera-
tion.  Most fundamentally, there is little reason to believe that people with sub-
stantial, long-term, material interests in achieving a particular outcome are go-
ing to abandon those interests and their dedication to those outcomes as sweet 
reason emerges from the talk fest.  Moreover, there is the serious methodologi-
cal question of how we could ever discern whether a particular discussion had 
shifted from a mode of interest aggregation to deliberation.  Pluralist and delib-
erative models of decisionmaking both prescribe the same observable proce-
dures.  All concerned interests are to have a seat at the table.  A maximum ex-
position of relevant data and the most scientifically valid analysis of that data 
possible should be achieved.  All relevant questions should be asked and an-
swered.  And, in many versions, the resulting decision should be subject to a 
further independent judicial review.  If all these procedures have been ob-
served, does it result in a perfect pluralism presumably leading to Pareto opti-
mality, or in a good deliberation presumably leading to a converging and reor-
dering of particular interests that ultimately achieve the public interest?  The 
only way to tell would be to calculate what particular policy would have been 
achieved by mere interest aggregation and compare that imagined outcome 
with the actual one.  If all the procedural norms have been met and the actual 
outcome is different and objectively better than the imagined outcome, then one 
would conclude that deliberation had occurred.  Both imagining the aggregation 
outcome and objectively evaluating the actual outcome seem beyond current 
research capacity. 
 
 16. See Joshua Cohen & Charles Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997). 
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B. Technocracy Disguised As Deliberation 
Quite apart from the inherent difficulties of the deliberative vision, a grave 
danger lurks that is well illustrated by E.U. developments.  The great friends of 
the comitology process previously described are wont to defend it on the 
grounds that while the Council engages in national interest aggregation, the 
committees are deliberative, precisely because they are composed of subject 
matter experts dedicated to achieving economically and technologically best 
policy outcomes.17  The whole paraphernalia of deliberation is employed as a 
cover for technocratic government.  Indeed, a kind of super-deliberation is 
imagined in which very knowledgeable people, devoid of any interests except 
the interest in truth, talk together.  It is not even necessary to transcend the self-
ish interests brought to the table because all those interests are excluded in fa-
vor of disinterested, scientific decisionmakers.  Deliberation brings back New 
Deal blind faith in agency expertise, or rather is an attempt at reviving a Euro-
pean faith in the public service serving the public order that has severely 
eroded.  In transnational regimes, the desire to transcend national logrolling, 
the need to establish some sort of non-electoral legitimacy, and the very real 
technical complexity of transnational regulatory issues create a natural push 
toward technocratic government under the camouflage of deliberation. 
VI 
OPAQUE REGULATION 
The next building block in this structure of transnational administrative law 
is a complex of interacting regulatory ideas and practices that combine to 
achieve an opaque regulatory process not easily subjected to any set of exterior 
norms.  One element of this complex is the disenchantment with command-and-
control regulation.  Preferred substitutes are government-provided financial in-
centives; the construction of regulatory markets (for example, transferable pol-
lution licenses); “soft law”; “open methods of coordination,” such as govern-
ment pronouncements and jawboning; “benchmarking”; negotiated, mediated, 
or consensual rulemaking; and, even more preferred, intimate and direct forms 
of corporatism, such as government ownership of significant stock holdings or 
public directorships.18  Only one such device, regulation by reporting and publi-
cation requirements, renders regulation more transparent.  The rest tend to add 
up to a kind of big, soft pillow that is very hard to punch legally.  No one has 
ever quite broken the law or ever quite obeyed it because nothing is ever quite 
the law.  Regulation ceases to be a regiment and becomes a chat room. 
The metaphor may suggest a solution.  Perhaps the chat can be put online 
and thus subject to some degree of public scrutiny and even democratic con-
 
 17. Christian Joerges & Jürgen Neyer, Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Prob-
lem-Solving, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 609 (1997). 
 18. See Francis Snyder, Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 197 (Samuel Martin ed., 1994). 
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trol.19  But the languages in which regulatory chats are conducted tend to be 
highly complex—technical ones that privilege those with the greatest resources 
and highest incentives to attain fluency.  Here again, the growth of transna-
tional NGOs, and particularly those opposing multinational business enterprise, 
might provide a window into transnational regulatory corporatism.  Our faith in 
NGOs, however, is partly built on the American pluralist experience, and that 
experience is in turn partly built on the American practice of private causes of 
action in regulatory matters.  The farther away we move from command-and-
control regulation, the more difficult it is to frame justiciable private actions, 
and so the less likely that interest group control can serve as a surrogate for di-
rect electoral control. 
VII 
INDEPENDENT AGENCIES 
Next, again drawing on the U.S. and E.U. experiences, it is worth contem-
plating the vogue in “independent agencies.”  There was a time, within the 
memory of living man, when American independent agencies were out of 
vogue.  There was much talk of “capture” and much talk of the need for Presi-
dential coordination of executive branch policies—coordination rendered diffi-
cult by the independence of the independent agencies.20  Much of the regulation 
that was the target of deregulation was the regulation conducted by the alpha-
bet soup of independent agencies.  Indeed, in the current scene of American 
business scandal, questions are raised about why prosecutors rather than the 
SEC have led the way. 
The American experience with independent agencies looks much better 
from the other side of the Atlantic than from this one.21  The recent U.S. relative 
happiness with the Federal Reserve has obscured earlier Presidential com-
plaints about its potential for disrupting any possible coordinated government 
financial management of the economy.  The dismantling of the International 
Chamber of Commerce and the Foreign Policy Centre and the sporadic travails 
of the FCC has been largely ignored in Europe.  Perhaps most importantly, 
most Europeans—and probably most Americans—think that the EPA is an in-
dependent agency rather than what it really is:  a Cabinet department denied an 
official seat in the Cabinet.  Nor do most Europeans understand that the 
American independent agencies were rendered quasi-independent of the Presi-
dent not by Congressional design but by Supreme Court opinion, and that many 
 
 19. Joseph Weiler made this suggestion. 
 20. MARVIN H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955); 
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941); JAMES LANDIS, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 21. See THE NEW EUROPEAN AGENCIES (Alexander Kreher ed., 1996) 
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of them were designed not to be politically neutral but to institutionalize a par-
tisan balance between the two major political parties.22 
The rather misunderstood U.S. experience is supported by a further misun-
derstanding.  One of the thrusts of the NPM movement has been the creation of 
new independent agencies designated to administer or implement certain gov-
ernment programs, while policymaking, and political responsibility for those 
programs, is retained by Cabinet departments.  Like the scientific deliberation 
vision of comitology, the goal is a separation of politics and administration.  The 
agency approach has been most extensively followed in the U.K., where, with 
some quibbles, it is viewed as relatively successful and certainly more successful 
than some of the privatization schemes.23  What those favoring independent 
agency development in the E.U. tend to neglect is that NPM concentrates on 
agency development for the service delivery rather than for the regulatory func-
tions of government.  There is a fairly obvious, although not necessarily correct, 
argument in favor of government adopting business organization and practices 
when it is delivering goods and services to consumers—an argument that does 
not apply when it is regulating business rather than doing business. 
So far, the potential risks to policy coordination posed by the proliferation 
of E.U. independent agencies has been camouflaged by the insistence that these 
agencies are only information-gathering entities as opposed to command-and-
control regulatory entities.  In reality, some of the agencies do have some regu-
latory functions, such as drug licensing, and most are engaged, not perhaps in 
command-and-control regulation, but in a variety of “soft” regulation modes.24  
Certainly, at best it would be naïve to assert that the European Environment 
Agency is not regulating when it gathers data and publishes an analysis of that 
data purporting to show that French industrial pollution is adversely affecting 
German vineyards. 
The E.U. independent agencies parallel comitology not only in the pur-
ported separation of politics or policy from administration but in the masking of 
technocracy by national representation in a transnational body.  Typically, each 
independent agency is staffed by technical experts but supposedly overseen by a 
board composed of one director representing each Member State.  Given the 
high-tech subject matters of the agencies, there can be little doubt about who is 
in control between everyday career technicians and occasionally appearing, lay 
boards of directors.  And, like comitology, the basic raison d’être of the agen-
cies is the substitution of technocratic legitimacy for a supposedly deficient de-
mocratic legitimacy. 
 
 22. See Martin Shapiro, The Problems of Independent Agencies in the United States and the Euro-
pean Union, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 276 (1997). 
 23. NEW STEPS: IMPROVING MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (Barry J. O’Toole & Grant Jordan 
eds., 1995). 
 24. R. De Housse, Regulation by Networks in the European Community: the Role of European 
Agencies, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 246 (1997). 
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VIII 
CONCLUSION: FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS  
IN TRANSNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION LAW 
When all of these building blocks are taken together, one can certainly build 
a very dismal castle.  Future transnational regulatory regimes are likely to arise 
in relatively high-tech or otherwise complex spheres of activity.  They are likely 
to face the usual national paradox.  States will not become members without 
strongly institutionalized Member State representation in the regulatory bodies.  
And given the near impossibility of creating genuine, direct electoral responsi-
bility for such bodies, national representation will provide the only available 
means of achieving any sort of democratic legitimacy.  Yet if the institutional 
structure of the regime is highly politicized in the sense of providing for veto-
like or near veto-like powers, or even very strong logrolling capacities for par-
ticipating states the substantive, transnational rationality of the regulations pro-
duced will be at grave risk. 
The difficulty of achieving electorally based legitimacy, the high-tech nature 
of the sought-after regulation, and the potentially disruptive force of national 
political interests may, á la E.U., provide a heightened appeal for technocratic 
government.  Turning over key decisions to technical experts with one or more 
drawn from each Member State can provide the appearance of national repre-
sentation while in reality achieving only the representation of the interests 
technical experts derive from their particular expertise.  Given current anti-
command-and-control sentiment and the resulting vogue in soft law and quasi-
corporatist regulatory negotiation,25 technocratic decisions may be conveyed by 
various murmurs among insiders—among the regulators and the regulated.  But 
these decisions by their very nature are difficult for the supposed regulatory 
beneficiaries to follow, let alone challenge.  In response, those transnational in-
terests with the resources to organize proficiently will, with more or less success, 
form NGOs that will seek to bully their way into both the technocratic decision 
processes and the corporatist negotiation processes. 
One appealing mode of moving toward technocracy, with a sop to national 
interest and the promise of neutrality among national interests, is the independ-
ent agency with some sort of nominal board of directors of national representa-
tives.  This would likely result in the proliferation of independent agencies, cre-
ating both severe problems of coordination and extreme diffusion of authority, 
which in turn would render any sort of democratic accountability even more dif-
ficult.  And finally, the technocratic, corporatist, nondemocratic nature of these 
transnational regulatory networks would be disguised and lauded as the newest 
triumph of deliberation, one that by definition produces the best, most rational 
achievement of the shared values of mankind. 
 
 25. See discussion supra Part VI. 
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All other things being equal, the role of judicial review in the regimes I have 
imagined would be minimal, with judges of whatever transnational courts might 
be established deferring to technocratic expertise once they had assured them-
selves that minimal procedural requirements had been met.  But all other things 
are not equal.  Environmentalism may have been the great religious movement 
of the late twentieth century.  Human rights may well be the great religion of 
the early twenty-first century.  And with the fall from grace of socialism, human 
rights, quite apart from its intrinsic appeal, also provides a convenient channel 
for venting anti-capitalist sentiment.  Rightly or wrongly, many human rightists 
believe that judges are a better potential target for their “–ism” than other poli-
cymakers, and that judges waving the rights baton are likely to be successful in 
imposing the rightists’ preferences on both the technocratic and democratic 
fronts.  Moreover, the human rights movement, while still notably busy trying to 
assure negative rights—that is, rights against government misconduct—is also 
more and more involved with the promotion of positive rights, such as the right 
to employment, subsistence, housing, health care, and so on. 
These “new property” rights are heavily implicated in transnational regula-
tory regimes.  Thus, it may reasonably be anticipated that future transnational 
regulatory institutional arrangements are likely to include reviewing courts with 
some sort of mandate to defend positive rights against regulatory deprivations.  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has proclaimed its dedication to human 
rights but without saying whether its vaguely stated vision encompasses positive 
rights.  So far, the regulatory transparency and human rights jurisprudences of 
the ECJ have not intersected.  But there is enough here and in the recent pro-
liferation of transnational courts and flourishing of transnational arbitration tri-
bunals to suggest that future transnational regulatory regimes will provide for 
judicial review that might serve as some check on technocratic and neo-
corporatist deliberative governance.  The pessimist, however, might expect that 
there might be just enough judicial review to further legitimate such governance 
without really ameliorating its insider trading. 
Much depends on the skill and motivation of judges and the style of their 
review.  Reviewing judges could emphasize procedures facilitating transparency 
and participation, at least opening corporatist deliberation to outside observa-
tion and influence.  To some degree, judges acting as surrogates for the lay pub-
lic can demand that technocrats present an explanation of regulatory decisions 
in a sufficiently non-technocratic way so that the public can understand them.  
They can avoid demanding perfect decisions defined in every detail—the kind 
of demands that have generated huge technical records in the United States, re-
cords that judges cannot understand and that camouflage rather than admit 
regulatory uncertainties.26 
 
 26. See Martin Shapiro, The Frontiers of Science Doctrine, in INTEGRATING SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERTISE INTO REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING: NATIONAL DECISIONS AND EUROPEAN 
INNOVATIONS 325, 340 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 1997). 
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One historical lesson, however, to which politicians repeatedly appear singu-
larly blind is that the junk yard dog of judicial review, once unleashed, will 
likely have a much larger bite than anticipated.  Perhaps a future transnational 
administrative law will emerge, creating sufficient transparency and participa-
tion such that transnational technocracy will achieve some meaningful level of 
pluralist, even if not electoral, democracy. 
Here, the U.S. experience may be instructive.  As already noted, the initial 
response of courts to the New Deal technocratic explosion was extreme defer-
ence to technocratic expertise.27  In the longer run, however, the federal courts 
came to demand very high levels of transparency and public participation in the 
decisionmaking process of the experts and indeed demanded that the experts 
demonstrate that they had not only invited but taken into account public inputs.  
Courts even came to demand that the experts both fully lay out those inputs on 
the record and defend the rationality of their decisions.28 
Again, some tendencies in the same direction can be identified in the E.U.29  
In both situations, these judicial efforts to inject elements of democratic control 
into technocratic decision making are the result of expansive judicial interpreta-
tions of legal norms requiring that decisions by expert regulators be accompa-
nied by “statements of basis and purpose” or “reasons.”  Future transnational 
regimes can create reviewing courts and provide similar textual hooks for ag-
gressive judicial review requiring the experts to open their decisionmaking 
processes to public scrutiny.  The recent American backlash against aggressive 
review30 and the hesitation of the ECJ to go too far down this path, however, 
signal that the costs of such review in terms of agency resources and delay are 
very substantial.  Consciousness of those costs tends to restore the attractive-
ness of technocratic deliberation. 
Activist judicial review in the United States certainly has enhanced the abil-
ity of NGOs to inject themselves, by lawsuits and threats, into expert decision-
making processes.  Either with or without such judicial assistance, at least those 
content with pluralist democracy might seek to construct transnational regula-
tory regimes in ways that provide substantial opportunities for NGOs, if not 
electorates, to breach the walls of the technocratic castles I have been envision-
ing.  Surely, the major battle to be fought is between those who envision trans-
national regulation as properly placed in the hands of technically expert delib-
erators and those who seek a gate through which politics may enter. 
 
 27. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 28. See Stewart, supra note 5, at n.2. 
 29. See sources cited supra note 8 and the discussion supra Part II.B. 
 30. See Richard Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 
(1995). 
